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National Development and the Fight over Black Gold: 
U.S. Perspectives on the Argentine Oil Industry 1946-1955 
Clayton S. Oppenhuizen  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper summarizes the relationship between the U.S. and Argentina in the 
immediate post WWII period focusing on both nations aims in developing 
Argentina’s oil industry. It is a comparison on the intension of negotiations 
between the two nations focusing on bargaining strategies and ultimate goals of 
what developing an industry can mean to multiple actors on an international stage. 
 
U.S. Perspectives on the Argentine Oil Industry 
Throughout the twentieth century oil has boosted manufacturing, increased trade and created 
wealth for many nations. Due to this it has been the greatest commodity driving industrial 
growth. This commodity from the period of 1943-1955 in Argentina played an essential role. It 
was in this time period that it would become one of the key supplies in an ongoing struggle 
between the influence of United States involvement in Argentine development and Argentina’s 
goal of becoming economically self-sufficient. In seeking self-sufficiency President Juan Perón 
of Argentina implemented the tactic of the “Third Position”. This concept was one that many 
non-alignment nations used both in WWII and in the Cold War. Yacimientos Petroliferos 
Fiscales (YPF) was the national oil company in Argentina at the time and was key in 
deliberations between Perón and United States ambassadors. Perón sought development but 
wanted to limit the role of external forces in his nation and the U.S. sought to implement policies 
that were the precursors to modernization theory that would come to dominate the later Cold 
War era in Latin America. This began an era where autonomous development was perceived as a 
threat to U.S. foreign policy and global hegemony. 
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The research I have conducted adds to the historical understanding of U.S.-Argentine relations of 
the era. This is especially important given the need for oil in a time when national development 
strategies and international relations systems experience dramatic shifts. Analyzing U.S. 
reactions to national development and Peronism adds a seldom-analyzed view of foreign 
relations history. My primary source materials for research are the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, hereafter referred to as FRUS documents collection. The series is organized by 
administration, topic and region. It is available in research libraries throughout the country 
(including Jerome Library on Bowling Green States campus). More recently, the volumes have 
been digitized and made available online by the University of Wisconsin and the Office of the 
Historian. These documents expose the intentions of U.S. diplomats in Argentina. They cover a 
myriad of topics focusing on the very general economic issues to specifics of what wells need to 
be developed in Argentina. The FRUS documents will be used to analyze diplomatic history as a 
main approach. In conjunction with the literature on Peronism, my reading gives context on the 
dynamics of macro theories and reactions two theoretical implementation by both the U.S. and 
Argentina. I argue that Perón’s aims were to develop his nation toward eventual geopolitical 
independence but the U.S. sought to make them dependent so as to gain favor in the region and 
sway other leaders in Latin America away from developing the way Perón planned to develop 
Argentina. 
 
The paper relies on diplomatic correspondence between U.S. ambassadors, embassy officers, 
U.S. secretaries of state, as well as Argentine officials and President Perón. The Office of the 
Historian regularly compiles an exhaustive (but not complete) list of declassified correspondence 
and reports and publishes them in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) collection. 
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The series is organized by administration, topic and region. It is available in research libraries 
throughout the country (including Jerome Library on Bowling Green States campus). More 
recently, the volumes have been digitized and made available online by the University of 
Wisconsin and the Office of the Historian.   
U.S. interests in Argentina 
The geopolitical aims of the U.S. in Latin America during the early 1940s were fostered by the 
Good Neighbor policy. However this aim would change as the international climate shifted from 
WWII era into the Cold War. Positions arose and the binary shifted from Allied V. Axis to 
Capitalism V. Communism. In this era though there was the belief of the “Third Position” whose 
economic equivalent is autonomous national industrialization. This ideology excluded both the 
U.S. and USSR as it sought to develop without assistance of either. However, the U.S. sought to 
establish and maintain agreements and alliances through market based economics with these 
nations. The push by the U.S. to control geopolitics is emphasized through the tension between 
Juan Perón and ambassador Spruille Braden (Ambassador from 5/21-9/23/1945) during Perón’s 
campaign for the presidency (Table 1 displays ambassadors from 1939 to 1949)(Smith, 
2008;Tulchin, 1990). In reaction to this Perón’s administration and workers unions adopted 
protectionist policies causing the U.S. to move diligently to become the central in leading 
countries to industrialize through markets as well as U.S. assistance (Dorn, 1999; Maxfield et al., 
1990). However, Perón saw this as an opportunity to industrialize and a way of liberation from 
dependency on the U.S. and other global powers. The aims were admirable but much of the 
WWII ideals were weighing in the minds of U.S. policy makers and paired with the impending 
Cold War many viewed Perón’s aims as a direct and defiant threat to U.S. goals in the region 
(Vannucci, 1986). 
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Table 1: U.S. Ambassador’s to Argentina: 1939-1949 
 
 
 
Perón’s protectionist philosophy manifested itself in the “Third Position” that encouraged other 
geopolitical actors to arise in competition with the U.S. and Soviet Union (Dorn 1999, 331-51). 
This protectionism, paired with U.S. market control aims completely eradicated the “Good 
Neighbor” policies established by Roosevelt and instead moved for power via soft aims (Lopez-
Maya, 1995; Dorn 1999, 331-51; MacDonald 1980, 386-390). The key time period of the 
reinvention of U.S. policies was from 1946-1950; this was a turbulent time for Argentina and the 
U.S. alike that proved to be vital to negotiations and solidification of their relationship.  
Peronism 
Understanding the origin of Peronism is essential when analyzing U.S.-Argentine relations of 
Perón’s first administration. The key factor is that unions negotiated with employers over 
conditions, wages and projects. The decisions made in negotiations applied to union and non-
union workers alike. Similarly State-Unionized workers were accepting the same benefits. This 
is vital in understanding why workers pushed hard for YPF expropriation of wells and oilrigs 
from international corporations (James 1988, 7-40). 
 
Other analysis aims to overturn the notion that Argentine labor was weak before Perón’s rise to 
power. In addition it discusses the strength and relationship workers had with Perón during his 
first tenure in power. Highlighted by this is that subsidiary workers organizations and impotent 
industrial capitalists were the source of Perón’s national populism (Adelman 1992, 243-59). Yet 
U.S. Ambassadors to 
Argentina 
Starting Date Ending Date 
Norman Armour 6/19/1939 6/29/1944 
Spruille Braden 5/21/1945 9/23/1945 
George S. Messersmith 5/23/1946 6/12/1947 
James Bruce 8/21/1947 8/20/1949 
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another key factor is the importance of Perón’s relationship with industrialists. Perón’s emphasis 
on workers virtually nullified his relationship with industrialists in Argentina at the time. This is 
vital as Perón did seek out private corporate assistance for Argentina’s oil issues later in his 
administration. Furthermore it would lead to Perón’s eventual overthrow in 1955 because his 
policies supporting workers were antithetical to industrialists. (Horowitz 1990, 199-217). Further 
analysis addresses the junction between the government and labor in Argentina. The main 
analysis focusing on government involving labor through middle and working class people in 
their plans for stability (Little 1973, 644-62; Buchanan 1985, 61-95). 
 
State autonomy was a vital part of Peronism that began with the 1943 coup. Autonomy was a 
reaction the U.S. and British pressures during the war effort. This theory is true even after as 
U.S. interests played a factor in shaping the Argentine oil industry (Waisman 1989, 159-74). In 
contrast to this various scholars discuss the domestic factors that created Peronism. A vital 
analysis is that of the mass movement as a massive mutual benefit society (MBS). In doing this 
and extending social security to more workers than ever, Perón generated a large debt and made 
MBS redundant (Munck 1998, 573-90). This illustrates the debt Perón generated that hurt his 
aims of development as well as the issues workers had with Peronism. Furthermore, sociological 
analysis of Peronism displayed Perón’s secured cities, townships and the countryside in an effort 
to form solidarity (Smith 1972, 55-73). Seeing the roots of Perón’s support based in cities makes 
it even more understandable why many manufacturing unions are at the forefront of his 
policymaking and not agrarian or unions based in the outside of cities. One thesis addresses how 
the changes that created Peronism came to be and what they meant to workers in Perón first 
administration. The three biggest factors were WWII creating deep divides between dominant 
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classes, the desire to continue the process of industrialization and finally the government’s 
decision to expand social security and industrialization. Once Perón gave security and assurances 
to some workers more began to demand policies that assisted their industries or unions (Di Tella 
1981, 33-56). YPF workers and higher officials did ask Perón to give contracts and assurances to 
them in order to develop both the petrol industry and YPF as a workers union. However, this 
came to be a divide between workers and Perón later in his administration.  
U.S. & Argentine Oil Trade (1930s-1955) 
Table 2: Argentine Oil Consumption Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: George Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist Movements and 
State Companies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 407.  
Time 
Period 
Production 
(gross) 
Imports 
(gross) 
Consumption 
(net) 
Percentage 
imported 
1935-9 2,740 1,780 4,120 22.8 
1940-4 3,780 1,110 4,470 16.4 
1945-9 3,630 3,400 6,340 48.3 
1950-4 4,990 5,440 9,460 52.2 
1955 5,000 7,560 11,450 60.2 
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From 1930-1943 there was a tremendous shift in Argentine production as well as consumption of 
oil. The biggest shift was a law in 1932 in which YPF was integrated as a government entity. 
This law allowed for greater political control of YPF but barred any and all expansion of private 
industry that did not support development of YPF. The latter segment of the law limited YPF’s 
ability to expand as well (Philip 1982, 401-3). Peronism’s shortcomings in the Argentine oil 
industry. Solberg effective displays the assimilation of many workers unions into YPF, although 
they made better wages workers now needed approval to strike and were granted only what the 
government administration saw as fit (Solberg 1979, 156-83). Kaplan analyzes YPF from a 
leftist perspective, his analysis displays the fact that Perón’s inability to fully nationalize or even 
defend the oil industry created conditions that required U.S. assistance. This was amplified since 
Europe was in shambles unable to financially or industrially assist Argentina (92-105). 
 
Though oil was not a hot button issue during WWII in Argentine-U.S. relations it was relevant as 
early as 1942. In early December of 1942 YPF requested oil industry materials from U.S. 
companies, in particular Standard Oil. U.S. official Philip Clover negotiated with Sr. Villa (head 
of YPF) about the required materials. This negotiation failed, as the materials needed could not 
be provided because it was going to YPF production fields, very little would go to Standard Oil 
or Ultramar (Bohan 1943, 379-80). The U.S. was unwilling to give materials to a nationalized 
organization even before Perón’s tenure in power. The U.S. even took to asking other Allied 
Nations and multinationals for details on petroleum dealings with Argentina. They were not part 
of a so called petrol block in the Western Hemisphere and the State Department were stern in 
telling corporations they should be weary of any oil ships under an Argentine flag (Hull, 1943, 
381-2). The Argentine government began to receive tons of alloys and steels intended for YPF to 
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use on active oilrigs in late March. The importance of materials being transferred by the U.S. is 
that they were not going to be used on Standard Oil or Ultramar rigs. However, Hugh Millard at 
the embassy believed that given the estimates of oil being produced and steel coming in by the 
end of 1943 the U.S. owned oil companies would be able to receive materials from the Argentine 
government (Millard 1943, 382-3). On April 30th 1943 ambassador Armour contacted Secretary 
of State Hull about the contract from 1942 being upheld in principle. The contract stated that 
Argentina would still trade petroleum with other nations of the Western Hemisphere though they 
had no direct contract with the United States. The latter stipulation was essential as the U.S. was 
spread thin due to the war effort, but having the petroleum available to the U.S. and other nations 
in North and South America would only ease the tensions brought on by WWII (Armour 1943, 
383-4).  
 
The negotiations were for 36,000 metric tons of petroleum industrial equipment in a 12-month 
period, of which YPF would receive 24,000 tons. A U.S. government study found that Argentina 
was asking for 68 percent of total equipment intended for all of Latin America during the same 
time period. Armour cited that the new regime (after the 1943 coup) believed that the 1942 
negotiations were all but finalized. This was utterly wrong, as the U.S. had no intentions of 
accepting the initial offer from the very beginning of negotiations (Hull 1943, 388-90). Armour 
reminded Hull that though the negotiated contract seemed rather obtuse by U.S. standards, it was 
rather fair. Citing the fact that other American republics entered the petroleum pool not because 
of ties to America but because they could not prosper more outside of the pool and that 
Argentina was giving 10% of its oil to the pool in a year where Argentina was operating at a 35 
percent shortage. Armour finished his address stating,  
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Even though 36,000 tons of material over the next 12 months may be more than another 
South American country receives, Argentina’s contribution to the petroleum pool is also 
greater. Moreover since April 1942, almost no petroleum industry material has been 
received here and therefore the quantity expected over 12 months may be compared with 
what other countries will have received over 27 months ending with June 1944 (1943, 
390-2).  
Armour’s emphasis on this negotiation was strategic as the new government in Argentina was 
already lack stable negotiations with the U.S. government. Armour addressed this candidly in a 
telegram to Secretary of State Hull on June 26, 1943. Citing that the negotiations could have 
been taken off the table before the coup and it would not have affected U.S.-Argentine relations. 
Now that the new regime is in power the negotiations were heightened. Armour warns that any 
attempt to renegotiate should not be considered, but rather postpone any petroleum negotiations 
so as to avoid the issues had with this negotiation. The U.S. believed the tonnage to be negotiable 
when it was actually an already negotiated amount by Armour with YPF and members of 
Argentina’s government. Argentina’s petrol assistance to South America was based solely on 
acquiring the specified amount of industrial equipment (Armour 1943, 399-400). The 
negotiations were agreed upon however it was not what either nation desired. 
 
The negotiations for equipment were annoying for both Argentine and U.S. officials. Argentina 
needed the equipment to develop the wells that YPF was using and need better means to 
transport and generate oil. The U.S. had no excess materials to spare from the war effort, nor 
were they willing to take what little they had to spare and give it to Argentina for the 
development of their nationalized oil industry. The U.S. was trapped simultaneously with the 
need of developing good relations with a strong Latin American country but also a lack of desire 
in dealing with a nation that was disengaged with the war effort.  
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From 1944-1946 oil was not a main factor in U.S.-Argentine relations. It wasn’t until November 
12, 1946 that oil discussions first began. Then ambassador George Messersmith sat down with 
president Perón to discuss Perón’s emphasis on private investment in the development of his 
nation. In the days before Messersmith’s meeting with Perón he met with the heads of Standard 
Oil Argentina and Ultramar, both company heads urging Messersmith to negotiate with Perón 
about acquisition of YPF wells and development of those wells (Messersmith 1946). The new 
administration in Argentina had appointed and dismissed chairmen at YPF multiple times in this 
period. The results were that no stable negotiations could be made and that YPF was lacking 
centralized and stabilized power in the new administration (Philip 1982, 401-14). This was 
fractured the solidarity of Peronism that was fostered earlier in Perón’s administration. 
1947: Cold War Tensions & Negotiations 
In the early part of 1947 oil became a main discussion in the development of relations between 
the U.S. and Argentina. In Odell’s work “Oil and State in Latin America” oil was seen as a main 
source to development of the Argentine manufacturing industry. In many nations it is the 
primary mode of seeking development. In Argentina especially it is important because it 
produces much of its oil for domestic use and there is still a need to boost production in order to 
propel toward modernization. The options for Argentina are private foreign investment or loans 
from large international agencies like the IMF or nations like the United States (Odell 1964, 659-
73). 
 
On March 26 1947 a telegram was sent from acting Secretary of State Acheson to the Argentine 
embassy about a La Prensa article addressing the abolition of mixed oil companies in Argentina 
and expropriations of mixed company property (Acheson 1947, 278-9). Acting ambassador to 
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Argentina George Messersmith wrote on the tensions of the Argentine government, YPF and 
U.S. oil companies in the region in May of 1947. Messersmith’s first address regarded the 
government’s demand, under President Perón, to increase wages for workers at Standard Oil 
sites before an increase in price of oil can be discussed. Standard Oil believed that if there were 
not to agree to wage increases their sites would be taken in what would be considered a national 
energy emergency. The workers began a slow-down strike at YPF and it spread to private U.S. 
companies in Argentina, this resulted in the U.S. companies closing operations due to the 
dangerous nature of operating with few employees. Messersmith warned the companies that the 
shutdown would create resentment publicly toward them due to the shortages it was causing but 
the companies wanted assurances of oil price increases by Perón’s administration before 
increasing workers wages. An agreement was reached and the companies even supported a single 
union, which they believed to be detrimental to the oil industry. The Argentine government and 
U.S. interests brought the agreement to the workers but they refused to end the strikes citing that 
they needed more wage increases. This irritated U.S. representatives but they believed it must be 
settled between the Argentine Ministry of Labor and the workers. Messersmith refused to 
intervene (Messersmith 1947, 279-83). 
 
In early June of 1947, when Messersmith was relieved of his duties, ambassador James Bruce 
was appointed to Argentina. In his first meeting president Perón remarked that there was no 
question of Argentina’s friendship with the U.S. but to assume that ties between two countries 
are lasting is foolish and that things would be fine provided there was no “direct conflict of 
interests”. Perón went on to emphasize that he believed in private enterprise but also thought 
utilities should be government owned. Perón also felt Argentina could produce ten times the 
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amount of oil, with the machinery and assistance from U.S. entities, by opening regions from 
Mendoza to Salta and Tierra Del Fuego to Neuquen (Ray 1947, 283-4). 
 
Bruce received demands from Standard Oil to give to the economic minister, Señor Miranda, 
citing remedies to their oil shortage and discriminatory policies of Argentina since the 1930s. 
Since 1943 Argentina’s oil industry saw a decline of 8% in production, both public and private. 
Standard Oil’s strategy of development emphasized hands off approach by YPF toward private 
interests and creating a fifteen-year window where private industries would compete with YPF. 
The permanent idea being that Argentina shift to a private oil industry entirely, this also was 
addressed in their demands to Bruce. Bruce was asked by Standard Oil to get rid of all veto 
power YPF held, all import-export controls and the pricing systems Argentina uses that 
manipulated private earnings in the region (Stand Oil 1947, 285-6). Bruce did not directly 
comment on the summary by Standard Oil however he did address the points of price increases 
and expansion in cables to the U.S. secretary of state the following month. Bruce acknowledged 
the losses that Standard Oil suffered due to the lack of price increases, even bringing it to Perón’s 
attention. Perón apologized stating that he had recently appointed a new Board of Directors to 
YPF and thus negotiations were slowed (Bruce 1947, 286-290). 
Perón’s Five Year Aims 
The 1947 negotiations continued with tension as many private oil firms desired to maintain their 
properties and began believing expropriation was the intent of Perón and YPF all along. U.S. 
government representatives felt the fears of private companies were exaggerations of the truth. 
Perón believed that private industry could contribute but the U.S. government understood 
Argentine desires to nationalize the oil industry. The 1947 negotiations over U.S. interests 
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coordinating in development fell through and Argentina turned to her sister nation, Venezuela, 
and created a treaty in which they would supply Argentina oil needed in exchange for foodstuff. 
This would sufficiently meet their five-year plan goals. As president Perón stated,  
The Argentine oil policy must be based on the same principles on which all our economic 
policy is based: Maintenance of Argentine sovereignty over the wealth of our subsoil; 
rational and scientific exploitation by the State. When the State recovers immediate and 
direct command over the property belonging to the Nation, it must not relinquish the 
privilege of administering it, nor share functions that defend interests other than those of 
all Argentines (Bulletin 1947, 302-4). 
Perón’s stance was one of a man seeking to develop his own nation and one in which he believed 
that his third path could be a success. Nevertheless the U.S. was persistent in their stance of 
private enterprise’s stabilizing effect, though it would assist the larger regional and global 
markets more than the Argentine people.  
 
The issue of oil came down to a game of hardball negotiations between U.S. ambassadors, 
primarily Messersmith and Bruce, and president Perón. Perón wanted his oil industry developed 
and was open to private investment in order to do so, but he wanted that investment on his own 
terms. Messersmith and Bruce seemed willing to meet the most basic demands of workers 
striking initially and the basic needs of Argentine oil. However, they knew that even if Perón 
were to expropriate remaining mixed and foreign companies he had little to no capital to invest 
in the necessary materials to modernize the industry.  
1948-1955: Continued issues 
The years that followed (1948-55) were ones in which little change occurred in the oil industry. 
Perón integrated workers into the government coalition but even in this integration some sectors 
were ignored, YPF was one of these sectors. Perón called for 50 percent increase in production in 
his 1947 five-year plan. This strategy was meant to appease economic nationalists in Argentina 
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while also attempting to develop Argentina’s industry. Perón’s policies were hampered my 
domestic tangles of internal development with little capital to invest, but was also impacted by 
U.S. sanctions on heavy industry (Solberg 1979, 162-6). As displayed in Table 2 (on page 9) 
these sanctions by the U.S. on sending drilling and exploitation equipment created a “bottleneck” 
in the oil markets. Even Perón’s reshuffling of YPF’s board of directors in 1949, which created a 
noticeable increase in revenues, could not fully support YPF’s aims during Perón’s first 
administration. With this Perón turned to the U.S. and rebalanced the participation of private 
interests in the country in 1951 until he was taken out of power in 1955 (Philip 1982, 405-9). 
 
In addition to these issues U.S. foreign policy shifted away to focus more on the arms and 
governmental issues of the region rather than petroleum discussions. In 1949 Argentina suffered 
a dollar shortage that dramatically effected the negotiations on all economic issues. YPF’s 
refusal to sign a contract allowing direct importation of crude oil to Standard Oil and Ultramar, 
in order to refine it, created an economic strain on these American companies. These companies 
now had to get their crude through YPF. There were seven issues that the memorandum 
addressed in dealing with Standard Oil and Ultramar’s troubles. This began with a 20 percent 
increase because of YPF’s billing prices and a 10-15 percent surcharge for delivery and 
transportation. Transportation was another issue altogether, many of the deliveries were sporadic 
and when these American companies received crude oil it was often already partially refined. 
Finally workers slow-down strikes managed to control these companies’ refineries by creating 
conditions where entire refineries had to shutdown for weeks at a time (Griffis 1949, 522-3). In 
1950 a cable highlighting past discussions with Perón by Ambassador Griffis discussed the final 
situation of the petroleum debates. He focused on his final attempt to open negotiations however 
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Perón and YPF were unwilling and only sought to purchase Ultramar’s refineries in Argentina. 
Ultramar had by then been affected by the slow-down strikes so much that they closed their 
business (Griffis 1950, 693-5). Ultimately the U.S. feared Peróns ability to stir public opinion 
and mass movement but was convinced that stability of his administration was fading as the 
dollar crisis grew in Argentina.  
 
U.S. aims were tentative given the turbulent nature of Argentina in the immediate post-war 
period. The U.S. government was torn between an implementation of modernizing their trade 
partners while defending their own interests. The end result being that Argentina had to end 
negotiations with the U.S. and their companies, Standard Oil and Ultramar. Demanding too 
much from Argentina and believing the Argentine government was asking too much of them, 
Standard Oil ended up rejecting offers to oversee exploration of new wells and implementation 
of new machinery. The U.S. knew that Perón was a man of strong conviction, willing to do what 
he felt was best for his country. Perón’s own position perplexed and irritated many U.S. officials. 
Perón would in private discuss the use of private enterprise to develop oil in the region. Publicly 
Perón would preach nationalization as a means of keeping capitalist U.S. interests at bay. In 
addition nationalizing industries helped bolster labor support for Perón. The issue that caused 
these negotiations to fail was the question: how to develop the Argentina’s oil industry. This 
issue helped propel Perón’s “Third Position” in negotiations and made compromised deals 
difficult for both parties. The Argentine government believed that utilities should be under their 
control, U.S. government ideals were that a mixed, if not mostly private, industry would benefit 
all and the private industries in Argentina were unwilling to give up their foothold on the market 
in such a lush untapped market. Furthermore the U.S. knew that an emphasis on free enterprise 
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would assist their companies and the regional oil market rather than the Argentine people. U.S. 
emphasis on laissez-faire economics did not accommodate the realities of Argentina after the 
collapse of liberalism.  
 
Though Perón and Argentina attempted to solidify their position on the international stage it was 
ultimately not to be as U.S. pressures were too great along with internal turmoil from failing 
policies and a stratified society. However, it is seen that soft power, through the negotiations of 
Ambassador Bruce, was rather effective in shifting negotiations. This is an excellent example of 
U.S. concerns that mass movements not supporting their interests are perceived as threats. Thus 
situations were handled in a manner that sought to dampen if not eliminate perceived threats. In 
this instance the Cold War policy emerged that would continue as a dynamic of U.S. foreign 
policy to the present. The legacy that threats to our non-governmental institutions and our 
foreign policy ideology was born in this early Cold War period. These negotiations were 
exemplary of this ideology.  
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